IDSGAN: Generative Adversarial Networks for Attack Generation against
  Intrusion Detection by Lin, Zilong et al.
IDSGAN: Generative Adversarial Networks for Attack Generation
against Intrusion Detection
Zilong Lin1, Yong Shi1,2, Zhi Xue1,2,∗
1School of Cyber Security, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, P.R. China
2Shanghai Key Laboratory of Integrated Administration Technologies for Information Security, Shanghai, P.R. China
{zllinxs, shiyong, zxue}@sjtu.edu.cn
Abstract
As an important tool in security, the intrusion detection sys-
tem bears the responsibility of the defense to network attacks
performed by malicious traffic. Nowadays, with the help of
machine learning algorithms, the intrusion detection system
develops rapidly. However, the robustness of this system is
questionable when it faces the adversarial attacks. To im-
prove the detection system, more potential attack approaches
should be researched. In this paper, a framework of the gener-
ative adversarial networks, IDSGAN, is proposed to generate
the adversarial attacks, which can deceive and evade the in-
trusion detection system. Considering that the internal struc-
ture of the detection system is unknown to attackers, adver-
sarial attack examples perform the black-box attacks against
the detection system. IDSGAN leverages a generator to trans-
form original malicious traffic into adversarial malicious traf-
fic examples. A discriminator classifies traffic examples and
simulates the black-box detection system. More significantly,
we only modify part of the attacks’ nonfunctional features to
guarantee the validity of the intrusion. Based on the dataset
NSL-KDD, the feasibility of the model is demonstrated to at-
tack many detection systems with different attacks and the
excellent results are achieved. Moreover, the robustness of
IDSGAN is tested by changing the amount of the unmodified
features.
Introduction
With the spread of security threats in the internet, the intru-
sion detection system (IDS) becomes the essential tools to
detect and defend network attacks which are performed in
the form of the malicious network traffic. The IDS monitors
the network traffic and raises an alarm if the unsafe traffic
is identified. The main aim of IDS is to classify the network
records between normal ones and malicious ones.
In classification issues, machine learning algorithms have
been widely applied in IDS and achieved good results. These
detection algorithms have been utilized to monitor and an-
alyze the malicious traffic, including K-Nearest Neighbor,
Support Vector Machine, Decision Tree, etc (Tsai et al.
2009). In recent years, deep learning algorithms develop fast
and promote the further development in intrusion detections,
like Convolutional Neural Networks, Recurrent Neural Net-
works, Auto Encoder and so on (Li et al. 2017). These algo-
rithms improve the intrusion detection in accuracy and sim-
plification (Lin, Shi, and Xue 2018).
However, the intrusion detection system gradually ex-
poses its vulnerability under the adversarial examples: in-
puts that are close to original inputs but classified incor-
rectly (Carlini and Wagner 2017). Attackers attempt to de-
ceive models into the desired misclassification by using the
adversarial malicious traffic examples. And the generative
adversarial networks (GAN) are the potential chosen method
for such adversarial attacks.
Goodfellow et al. introduced GAN, a framework to train
the generative models (Goodfellow et al. 2014), whose main
idea is that two networks, the generator network and the dis-
criminator network, play a minimax game in order to con-
verge to an optimal solution (Lee, Han, and Lee 2017). GAN
has shown its state-of-the-art advance in the generation of
images, sound and texts (Ledig et al. 2017; Dong et al. 2018;
Su et al. 2018). Sharing the similar characteristic of texts or
sentences, information security is also the focused field for
GAN recently. Current researches have used GAN to im-
prove the malware detection or generate the adversarial mal-
ware examples for more threatening attacks (Kim, Bu, and
Cho 2017; Hu and Tan 2017b). But there is a lack of the
researches about the GAN used in IDS.
In this paper, we propose a new framework of GAN for
the adversarial attack generation against the intrusion detec-
tion system (IDSGAN). The goal of the model is to imple-
ment IDSGAN to generate malicious traffic examples which
can deceive and evade the detection of the defense systems.
Machine learning algorithms are assigned as the black-box
IDS, simulating the intrusion detection system in the real
world unknown with its internal structure. We design and
improve the generator and the discriminator on the basis of
Wasserstein GAN for its superior characteristics (Arjovsky,
Chintala, and Bottou 2017). The generator generates adver-
sarial attacks: adversarial malicious traffic. The discrimina-
tor provides feedback for the training of the generator and
imitates the black-box IDS. The attackers can perform at-
tacks based on the adversarial examples. In summary, we
make the following contributions:
• We design IDSGAN, an improved framework of GAN
against the intrusion detection system, to generate adver-
sarial malicious traffic examples to attack IDS. In the gen-
eration, the modification to the original attack traffic will
not invalidate its attack function.
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• To mimic attacks and IDS in real world, adversarial at-
tacks perform the black-box attacks and the machine
learning algorithms are used as the IDS in this model.
• IDSGAN presents good performance in the experiments,
and the detection rates to the adversarial examples ap-
proach 0 in various black-box IDS models and different
attacks, meaning that most of the adversarial attacks can
deceive and bypass the detection of the black-box IDS.
• We test and discuss the influence of the model under dif-
ferent amounts of the unmodified features in the traffic ex-
amples. The various attacks and detection algorithms af-
fect the model differently, which reflects incongruous ro-
bustnesses of IDSGAN under these attacks and IDS mod-
els.
Related Work
With the rapid development of machine learning algorithms,
the adversarial examples generation of machine learning al-
gorithms have attracted researchers’ interests and applied in
many fields. As an important and sensitive field, informa-
tion security is facing more challenges from the adversarial
attacks. Plenty of researches focus on the generation of ad-
versarial malicious examples in security.
Grosse proposed to apply the algorithm based on the for-
ward derivative of the attacked neural networks to craft ad-
versarial Android malware examples with the function of the
malware preserved (Grosse et al. 2016). The reinforcement
learning algorithm with a set of the functionality-preserving
operations was used for generating adversarial malware ex-
amples (Anderson et al. 2017). Rosenberg generated the ad-
versarial examples combining API call sequences and static
features with an end-to-end attack generation framework
(Rosenberg et al. 2018). Al-Dujaili presented 4 methods
to generate binary-encoded adversarial malware examples
with the preserved malicious functionality and utilized the
SLEIPNIR to train the robust detectors (Al-Dujaili et al.
2018). Besides, the adversarial spam also got the concern.
Zhou crafted the adversarial spam with the adversarial SVM
model and researched how to construct a more robust spam-
filter (Zhou et al. 2012).
GAN was implemented in generating adversarial exam-
ples in information security as well. Hu proposed a GAN
framework to generate adversarial malware examples for the
black-box attacks (Hu and Tan 2017b). Hu also leveraged
a new model to generate some adversarial API sequences
which would be inserted into the original API sequences
of malware to form the attacks, aiming at bypassing Recur-
rent Neural Networks (RNN) detection systems (Hu and Tan
2017a).
Although the adversarial technology has been widely ap-
plied in malware detection, there is little academic research
about the adversarial malicious traffic examples against IDS.
Our proposed model constructs the architecture of the gen-
erative adversarial networks for the adversarial attack exam-
ples targeting at IDS and successfully attacks many black-
box IDS models.
Proposed Method
We design IDSGAN, an improved model of GAN, for the
evasion attacks against IDS. According to the characteristics
of the dataset NSL-KDD, we need to preprocess the dataset
to fit the model. In IDSGAN, the generator, the discriminator
and the black-box IDS take their advantages to generate ad-
versarial malicious traffic examples. The aim of the method
is to perform the evasion attacks by deceiving the black-box
IDS model.
Dataset: NSL-KDD dataset description
Improved from KDD’99, NSL-KDD is utilized as a bench-
mark dataset to evaluate IDS today (Hu et al. 2015). In NSL-
KDD, the dataset comprises of the training set KDDTrain+
and the testing set KDDTest+.
To simulate the real network environment, the traffic data
contain the normal traffic and four main categories of mali-
cious traffic: Probing (Probe), Denial of Service (DoS), User
to Root (U2R) and Root to Local (R2L).
The traffic records in NSL-KDD are extracted into the se-
quences of the features combination, as the abstract descrip-
tion of the normal and malicious network traffic. There are
9 features in discrete values and 32 features in continuous
values, a total of 41 features. According to the meanings of
the features, these features consists of four sets including
“intrinsic”, “content”, “time-based traffic” and “host-based
traffic” (Davis and Clark 2011; Lee and Stolfo 2000), as
shown in Figure 1. The detailed description of what one set
of the features focuses on is listed below:
• “Intrinsic” features: reflect the inherent characteristics of
a single connection for the general network analysis.
• “Content” features: mark the content of connections
which indicate whether some behaviors related to the at-
tack exist in the traffic.
• “Time-based traffic” features: examine the connections in
the past 2 seconds, which have the same destination host
or the same service as the current connection, including
the “same host” features and “same service” features.
• “Host-based traffic” features: monitor the connections in
the past 100 connections, which have the same destination
host or the same service as the current connection, as the
mirror of “time-based traffic” features.
Figure 1: The distribution of the feature sets in a line of traf-
fic record in NSK-KDD, including features and a label.
Data preprocessing
In the data preprocessing, the data in NSL-KDD need the
processing of the numeric conversion and the normalization
Figure 2: The training of IDSGAN. The training dataset is divided into the normal traffic and the malicious traffic. After adding
noise, the malicious traffic is sent into the generator. The adversarial malicious traffic and the normal traffic are predicted by
the black-box IDS. The predicted labels and the original labels are used in the discriminator to simulate the black-box IDS. The
loss of generator is calculated based on the result of the discriminator and the predicted labels of the black-box IDS.
to become the input vectors of the traffic examples for IDS-
GAN.
In 9 discrete features, there are 3 features in nonnumeric
values and 6 features in binary values which are 0 or 1. To
convert the feature sequences into the numeric vectors as
the input, it is necessary to make the numeric conversion
on the nonnumeric features firstly, including protocol type,
service and flag. For instance, “protocol type” has 3 types of
attributes: TCP, UDP and ICMP, which will be encoded into
the numeric discrete values as 1, 2 and 3.
Afterwards, to eliminate the dimensional impact between
feature values in the input vectors, the standard scalar is uti-
lized to normalize the original and converted numeric fea-
tures into a specific range. For the better training and testing,
we implement Min-Max normalization method to transform
data into the interval of [0, 1], which is suitable for all the
discrete and continuous features. The Min-Max normaliza-
tion is calculated as below:
x′ =
x− xmin
xmax − xmin (1)
where x is the feature value before the normalization and
x′ is the feature value after the normalization. Besides, xmax
and xmin represent the maximum value and the minimum
value of this features in the dataset, respectively.
Structure of IDSGAN
With the rapid development of GAN, many versions of
GAN are designed for different requests. To prevent the non-
convergence and instability of GAN, IDSGAN is designed
based on the structure of Wasserstein GAN. In IDSGAN,
the generator modifies some specific features to generate
adversarial malicious traffic examples. The discriminator is
trained to imitate the black-box IDS and assist the genera-
tor training. The black-box IDS is implemented by machine
learning algorithms to detect attacks. By making the weight
parameters of the generator different from the IDS in the
training, the adversarial examples can be generated to evade
the detection of IDS. The framework of IDSGAN is delin-
eated in Figure 2.
Restriction in generating adversarial examples Al-
though the main purpose of the adversarial attack examples
generation is to evade IDS, the premise is that this genera-
tion should retain the attack function of the traffic.
According to the attack principles and purposes, it is evi-
dent that each category of attacks has its functional features,
which represent the basic function of this attack. On the
other word, the attack attribute remains undisturbed if we
only change the nonfunctional features, not the functional
features. Therefore, in order to avoid invalidating the traf-
fic, we must keep the functional features of each attack un-
changed. For the nonfunctional features of one attack which
don’t represent the function relevant to that attack, we can al-
ter or retain them. These retained features in the generation,
including functional features, are called the unmodified fea-
tures in this paper. As shown in (Lee and Stolfo 2000), the
functional features of each category of attacks in NSL-KDD
are presented in Table 1.
Attack
Functional features
Intrinsic Content Time-based
traffic
Host-based
traffic
Probe X X X
DoS X X
U2R X X
R2L X X
Table 1: The functional features of each attack category.
Generator As a crucial part of the model, the generator
plays the role of the adversarial malicious traffic example
generation for the evasion attack.
To transform an original example into an adversarial ex-
ample, each input vector of the traffic examples should con-
sists of an m-dimensional original example vector M and
an n-dimensional noise vector N . As the original example
part, M has been preprocessed. To be consistent with the
preprocessed vector, the elements of the noise part are com-
prised of random numbers in a uniform distribution within
the range of [0, 1] .
Our purposed structure of the generator has a neural net-
work with 5 linear layers. The ReLU non-linearity F =
max(0, x) is utilized to activate the outputs of former 4 lin-
ear layers. To make the adversarial examples meet the for-
mula of the original example vector M , the output layer
must have m units. The update of the parameters in this net-
work is based on the feedback from the discriminator.
In addition, there are some tricks in the processing of the
modified features. To restrict the output elements into the
range of [0, 1], the element which is above 1 is set as 1 and
the element which is below 0 is set as 0. Moreover, con-
sidering that “intrinsic” features are the functional features
in all the attacks in NSL-KDD, we will not modify the dis-
crete features with more than two values, all of which gather
in “intrinsic” features. So, the modified discrete features are
the binary discrete features. The values of these modified
discrete features will be transformed into binary values. The
threshold in the binary transformation is 0.5. The values
above or below the threshold will be transformed into 1 or
0.
Figure 3: The process of simulating the black-box IDS by
the discriminator.
Discriminator Without the knowledge about the structure
of the black-box IDS model, the discriminator is used to im-
itate the black-box IDS based on the adversarial malicious
traffic examples and the normal traffic examples. The im-
itation helps the generator training because the adversarial
attacks can try to bypass the IDS during the training of the
generator. Meanwhile, as a classification tool, the discrimi-
nator classifies the outputs of the generator and supplies the
feedback to the generator.
The discriminator is a multi-layer neural network to clas-
sify the malicious traffic and the normal traffic. Its training
data consist of the adversarial malicious traffic and the nor-
mal traffic.
As one of the main aim of the discriminator, the work of
imitating the ability of the black-box IDS needs the detec-
tion results of the black-box IDS to normal and adversarial
malicious traffic examples. First, the normal traffic exam-
ples and the adversarial malicious traffic examples are clas-
sified by the black-box IDS. Then, the detection results of
the black-box IDS are used as the target labels of the dis-
criminator’s training data to make the discriminator’s classi-
fication similar to the black-box IDS. The procedure of the
discriminator’s imitating the black-box IDS model is delin-
eated in Figure 3.
Training algorithms In the training of the generator, the
results obtained from the discriminator’s classification to the
adversarial examples provide the gradient information for
the generator’s training. The loss function of the generator
is defined as follows:
LG = EM∈Sattack,ND(G(M,N)) (2)
where Sattack is the original malicious traffic examples;
G represents the generator and D represents the discrimina-
tor. To train and optimize the generator to fool the black-box
IDS, we need to minimize LG.
For the discriminator training, the adversarial malicious
traffic examples are the part of the training set. According to
the above introduction about relationship between the train-
ing set and the predicted labels of the black-box IDS, the
loss of the discriminator is calculated by the output labels of
the discriminator and the predicted labels achieved from the
black-box IDS. Thus, the definition of the loss function of
the discriminator for the optimization is as follows:
LD = Es∈BnormalD(s)− Es∈BattackD(s) (3)
where s means the traffic examples for the training of the
discriminator; Bnormal and Battack respectively mean the
normal examples and the adversarial attack examples pre-
dicted by the black-box IDS.
According to Wasserstein GAN, RMSProp is the opti-
mizer of IDSGAN to optimize the parameters in the net-
works. Algorithm 1 shows an outline of the general IDS-
GAN training.
Experiments and Results
In the experiment, PyTorch is adopted as the deep learning
framework to implement IDSGAN (Paszke et al. 2017). The
purposed model is run and evaluated on a Linux PC with
Intel Core i7-2600.
IDSGAN is trained with the 64 batch size for 100 epochs.
The learning rates of the generator and the discriminator are
both 0.0001. The dimension of the noise vector is 9. The
weight clipping threshold for the discriminator training is
set as 0.01.
To evaluate the capacity of the model comprehensively
and deeply, various kinds of machine learning algorithms
are used as the black-box IDS in the experiments. Based on
the relevant researches in the intrusion detection, the adopted
algorithms of the black-box IDS in the experiments include
Algorithm 1 IDSGAN
Input:
Original normal and malicious traffic examples
Snormal, Sattack;
The noise N for the adversarial generation;
Output:
The trained generator G and the trained discriminator
D;
1: Initialize the generator G, the discriminator D and the
black-box IDS B;
2: for i = 0, 1, 2, do
3: for G-steps do
4: G generates the adversarial malicious traffic exam-
ples based on Sattack;
5: Update the parameters of G according to Eq. 2;
6: end for
7: for D-steps do
8: D classifies the training set including Snormal and
G(Sattack, N);
9: B classifies the training set, getting predicted la-
bels;
10: Update the parameters of D according to Eq. 3;
11: end for
12: end for
Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB), Mul-
tilayer Perceptron (MLP), Logistic Regression (LR), Deci-
sion Tree (DT), Random Forest (RF) and K-Nearest Neigh-
bor (KNN). The black-box IDS models have been trained
with their training set before the evaluation to IDSGAN.
The training set and the testing set are designed based on
the dataset NSL-KDD consisting of KDDTrain+ and KD-
DTest+. The training set for the black-box IDS consists of
one half of the records in KDDTrain+, including normal and
malicious traffic records. The training set of the discrimi-
nator includes the normal traffic records in the other half
of KDDTrain+ and the adversarial malicious traffic exam-
ples from the generator. Because GAN is applicable in the
binary classification, IDSGAN is able to generate the ad-
versarial examples for only one category of the attacks each
time. So, in every experiment, the training set of the genera-
tor is the records of one category of the attacks in the other
half of KDDTrain+. The records of one attack in KDDTest+
make up the testing set for the generator of one experiment
in which one kind of the adversarial attacks for the test are
generated to perform that attack against IDS.
For the experimental metrics, the detection rate and the
evasion increase rate are measured, showing the perfor-
mance of IDSGAN directly and comparatively. The detec-
tion rate (DR) reflects the proportion of correctly detected
malicious traffic records by the black-box IDS to all of those
attack records detected, directly showing the evasion abil-
ity of the model and the robustness of the black-box IDS.
The original detection rate and the adversarial detection rate
represent the detection rate to the original malicious traffic
records and that to the adversarial malicious traffic records,
respectively. In addition, we define the evasion increase rate
(EIR) as the rate of the increase in the undetected adver-
sarial malicious traffic examples by IDS compared with the
original malicious traffic examples, comparatively reflecting
the ability of IDSGAN, especially in different background.
These metrics are calculated as follows:
DR =
Num. of correctly detected Attacks
Num. of All the attacks
(4)
EIR = 1− Adversarial detection rate
Original detection rate
(5)
A lower detection rate means more malicious traffic
evades the black-box IDS, directly reflect the stronger abil-
ity of IDSGAN. On the contrary, a lower evasion rate reflects
more adversarial examples can be detected by the black-box
IDS, meaning that there is a decline on the comparative dis-
tance of the evasion attack capacity between original mali-
cious traffic and adversarial malicious traffic. So, the moti-
vation for IDSGAN is to obtain a lower detection rate and a
higher evasion increase rate.
Performance of IDSGAN in different attacks
To evaluate the model comprehensively, IDSGAN is trained
and, then, generates the adversarial malicious traffic in the
tests based on KDDTest+. Considering that DoS and Probe
are both the attacks based on the network, we only exper-
iment and analyze on DoS to reflect the performance of
IDSGAN on these kinds of attacks. In addition, the attacks
based on the traffic content like U2R and R2L are also ex-
perimented. Due to the small amount of the U2R and R2L
records in NSL-KDD and their similar characteristic, U2R
and R2L are gathered into one attack group in the experi-
ments.
Before applying IDSGAN, the original detection rates of
DoS, U2R and R2L are measured on the trained black-box
IDS, shown in Table 2. Due to the small amount of records
of U2R and R2L in the training set, the insufficient learning
makes the original detection rates to U2R and R2L low.
First, we test the capacity of IDSGAN in different attacks
with only the functional features unmodified. The results of
the experiments are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4. Accord-
ing to the results, all of the adversarial detection rates of
DoS, U2R and R2L under different black-box IDS models
decline and approach 0 after the processing of IDSGAN,
meaning that the IDS models are almost unable to classify
any adversarial malicious traffic examples. The distances be-
tween the original detection rates and the adversarial detec-
tion rates of these attacks are also large and evident.
As shown in Figure 4(a), the adversarial detection rates
of DoS under all detection algorithms remarkably decrease
from around 80% to below 2%. Although Multilayer Per-
ceptron shows the best robustness in the list of all the black-
box IDS models, its adversarial detection rate of DoS is only
1.56%. The evasion increase rates are all above 98%. The
results show the excellent performance of IDSGAN in DoS.
More than 98% of the adversarial DoS traffic examples can
evade the detection of the experimental IDS model in each
test.
Adding unmodified
features
Attack Metric SVM NB MLP LR DT RF KNN
— DoS Original DR (%) 82.37 84.94 82.70 79.85 75.13 73.28 77.22
— U2R & R2L Original DR (%) 0.68 6.19 4.54 0.64 12.66 2.44 5.69
× DoS Adversarial DR (%) 0.04 0.00 1.56 1.23 0.38 1.32 0.92
EIR (%) 99.95 100.00 98.11 98.46 99.49 98.20 98.81
× U2R & R2L Adversarial DR (%) 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
EIR (%) 100.00 88.53 100.00 100.00 99.76 100.00 100.00
X DoS Adversarial DR (%) 25.66 0.62 48.44 34.00 10.49 25.98 70.97
EIR (%) 68.85 99.27 41.43 57.42 86.04 64.55 8.09
X U2R & R2L Adversarial DR (%) 0.01 4.96 0.92 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.27
EIR (%) 98.51 19.87 79.74 100.00 94.87 100.00 95.25
Table 2: The performance of IDSGAN under DoS, U2R and R2L. The first and second lines in the table are the black-box IDS’s
original detection rates to the original testing set. “×” in “adding unmodified features” means that the lines are the performance
of IDSGAN with only the functional features unmodified. “X” in “adding unmodified features” means that the lines are the
performance of IDSGAN with the added unmodified features.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: The comparisons of the adversarial detection rates
and the original detection rates under different black-box
IDS models with only the functional features unmodified.
(a) is the results of DoS and (b) is results of U2R and R2L.
For U2R and R2L shown in Figure 4(b), although the dif-
ference of the original detection rates between algorithms
is noticeable, all the adversarial detection rates are equal to
or close to 0 after the adversarial generation, meaning that
most original malicious traffic examples of U2R and R2L
that could be detected are able to fool and evade the IDS
after the processing of IDSGAN. Adding a large amount of
the examples which could not be detected out after the gen-
eration lead that the evasion increase rates are high, all of
which are above 85%.
The low adversarial detection rates and the high evasion
increase rates obtained in the test under various attacks re-
flect that IDSGAN shows its great capacity for the adver-
sarial attack in the experiments. Facing adversarial attacks,
there are some tiny differences in the ability of IDSGAN and
the robustness of the black-box IDS models under different
categories of attacks and different IDS models.
Performance of IDSGAN with different amounts of
the unmodified features
In the research about the ability and robustness of IDSGAN,
the amount of the unmodified features is a significant factor
which decides the success of the adversarial attacks by our
purposed model. To evaluate the relationship between IDS-
GAN and the amount of unmodified features, the contrast
experiments are done on DoS, U2R and R2L, altering the
number of the unmodified features. With the consideration
that the functional features of each attack are the fewest fea-
tures representing the attack function, the only way to alter
the amount of unmodified features is to add nonfunctional
features on the base of the functional features. To test the
integral influence of adding potential features on IDSGAN,
these added unmodified features are chosen from each of the
other feature sets randomly. The ratios of the added features
in the rest of the sets are the same. The added unmodified
features in experiments are listed below.
• DoS:
“Content”:
hot, num failed logins, logged in, num compromised,
(a)
(b)
Figure 5: The comparisons of the evasion increase rates
under various black-box IDS models before adding un-
modified features and after adding unmodified features. (a)
is the results of DoS and (b) is results of U2R and R2L.
num root, num file creations, is guest login;
“Host-based traffic”:
dst host count, dst host rerror rate, dst host serror rate,
dst host same srv rate, dst host same src port rate;
• U2R & R2L:
“Time-based traffic”:
count, srv count, serror rate, srv serror rate;
“Host-based traffic”:
dst host srv diff host rate, dst host srv serror rate,
dst host srv count, dst host diff srv rate, dst host srv r-
error rate.
The results of the experiments are shown in Table 2 and
Figure 5. The ability and robustness of IDSGAN under dif-
ferent amounts of the unmodified features is clearly and
comparably presented by the evasion increase rate in Figure
5. Compared with the experiments with only the functional
features unmodified, the evasion increase rates in contrast
experiments decline or maintain.
With the increase of the amount of unmodified features,
more original information in one traffic record is retained af-
ter the adversarial generation. With the help of this increased
information, the black-box IDS is able to detect based on
more pristine and precise information, making more accu-
rate judgments in the test. Meanwhile, due to the strong per-
turbation from the modified features, the addition of the un-
modified features sometimes doesn’t help much to the detec-
tion of some IDS models like Logistic Regression when de-
tecting U2R and R2L. Therefore, the extents of the declines
in the evasion increase rates are different, reflecting incon-
gruous robustnesses of IDSGAN facing various attacks and
IDS models.
The degrees of the declines of the evasion increase rates
are related to the attack categories. For example, in Figure
5(a), the evasion increase rate of DoS under Logistic Re-
gression after adding the unmodified features declines by
41.04%. However, the evasion increase rate of U2R and R2L
under this detection algorithm doesnt change after adding
shown in Figure 5(b). Generally, the integral reduction of
the evasion increase rates in DoS is larger than that in U2R
and R2L.
Furthermore, the declines of the evasion increase rates
in the same attacks are also different between various IDS
models. As shown in Figure 5(a), the decrease of the evasion
increase rate under Naive Bayes in U2R and R2L is much
larger than others, meaning that the unmodified features ad-
dition has bigger impact on the performance of adversarial
U2R and R2L attacks under Naive Bayes.
Thus, the results of the experiments show that, although
IDSGAN still can generate some adversarial examples
which can evade the detection, the trend of the decline in the
evasion capacity of IDSGAN appears after adding unmodi-
fied features, meaning that more adversarial malicious traffic
examples fall to deceive the IDS with more original infor-
mation retained. The different degrees of the influence on
the performance of IDSGAN by adding unmodified features
reflect incongruous robustnesses of IDSGAN under various
attacks and black-box IDS models.
Conclusions
With the purpose of generating adversarial attacks to evade
the intrusion detection system, IDSGAN is a novel frame-
work of generative adversarial networks based on Wasser-
stein GAN, consisting of the generator, the discriminator,
the black-box IDS. Without implemented in raw traffic data,
the research is conducted on the benchmark dataset NSL-
KDD as the academic discussion. IDSGAN shows its good
capacity in generating adversarial malicious traffic examples
of different attacks, leading the detection rates of various
black-box IDS models to decrease to nearly 0. Furthermore,
in evaluating the robustness of IDSGAN by changing the
amount of the unmodified features, the evasion ability of the
adversarial malicious traffic examples reduces when adding
unmodified features. And, the degree of the reduction in the
IDSGANs performance is relevant to the category of the at-
tacks and the kind of black-box IDS models. The great per-
formances exhibited above indicate the wide feasibility and
flexibility of IDSGAN.
In the future, we will further focus on the research of IDS-
GAN. This research will concentrate on two aspects: first,
we will apply IDSGAN in more categories of intru-sion at-
tacks; second, for the definitive aim of the IDS defense de-
velopment, the increase of the IDSs robustness to IDSGAN
or other similar models is our critical work.
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